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I

T the consumer, has no practical way of knowing or discoverI

,ing
at present the quality of any food or drug he buys, much less
whether any particular brand of a product he purchases is good,
bad or indifferent as compared to any other particular brand which he
might have chosen, is well recognized. Thus he may be selecting, at a
single price, from among a number of brands which may range in quality
from the most excellent to those which are distinctly inferior.2 At the
same time, two brands of substantially the same quality may be offered
to him at prices which vary ioo per cent or more from the lower to the
higher.3 It has been indisputably established that the price at which a
particular article may sell is not a satisfactory, if any, index to the quality
of the product. 4 Nor does the use of brand or trade names supply an adequate guide.5 With the number of brands of a particular product running
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of the General Counsel, Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Member of the Connecticut
Bar.
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xThe term "consumer" is used in this article to refer to the ultimate consumer, that is, a
person who buys for his own or family use or consumption. It does not refer to one who purchases for resale or for processing and resale. For a statutory definition of the term "consumer"
in the sense used herein, see N.Y. Cahil's Consol. Laws (1930), tit. 1, § 16o (a).
2 See chart by W. C. Lynn, New Jersey Department of Agriculture, reproduced by permission in Quality Standards for Canned Goods, 2, Consumers' Div., National Emergency Council
(Oct. 1934); Coles, Standardization of Consumers' Goods (1932), I5, 27.
3 Supranote 2.
4Supra note 2; Brady, Standards and the Consumer, Consumers' Advisory Board, National
Recovery Administration (Mar. 7, 1934) (mimeographed); Coles, Standardization of Consumers' Goods (1932), 23-28; Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Commerce on
S. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933), 346; Riley, To Grade or Not to Grade, 23 Advertising and
Selling (Oct. ii, 1934); Chase and Schlink, Your Money's Worth (1927), 76.

s Coles, Standardization of Consumers' Goods (1932), 30-44; Wilcox, Brand Names, Quality and Price, 173 Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci. 8o (1934).
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into the hundreds, and in some instances into the thousands,6 the consumer, obviously, is at a loss if he attempts to make a selection on this
basis. Moreover, the consumer has no assurance that the particular unit
which he purchases at one time will be identical with, or equal in quality
to, the unit which he buys at another time. This is especially true where
the seller is not a manufacturer but is a wholesaler or jobber who distributes under his own distinctive trade name the products of several producers.
The fight for adequate protection of the consumer in this respect is of
long standing.7 Recently public interest in questions of food and drugs
has been given impetus by the proposals for a new food and drugs act8 and
by some of the emergency legislation. Earlier efforts to protect the consumer were largely concerned with public health and the need of protection against harmful, poisonous and deleterious foods and drugs. The
National Industrial Recovery Act 9 and the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, 0 both of which were expected, among other things, to effectuate a
rise in the general price level, have, however, served to emphasize the coexisting and coordinate need of insuring to the consumer a return in value
6 O'Brien, Standards for Consumers' Goods, 8, Bureau of Home Economics, U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture (Sept. 25, 1934) (mimeographed); Standards of Quality, 3, Bull. No. 3, Consumers'
Div., National Emergency Council (June 1934); Riley, To Grade or Not to Grade, 23 Advertising and Selling (Oct. ii, 1934).
7 Some consumers' organizations have been formed for the purpose of spreading consumer
education with respect to quality and value in the purchase of consumers' goods. Consumers'
Research, Inc., the Association of Home Economics, and the National Consumers' League are
some of them. See Corbett, The Activities of Consumers' Organizations, i Law and Contemporary Problems 61 (1933). The American Medical Association has a Foods Committee which
tests and recommends certain foods, and also a Bureau of Investigation concerned with the investigation of drugs. For a description of the Association's work, see Fishbein, The American
Medical Association's Work for Consumer Protection, i Law and Contemporary Problems 5o

(31933).

As to food and drugs legislation generally, see Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and
Drugs Legislation, i Law and Contemporary Problems 3 (1933).
It has been said of the Food and Drugs Act that it was designed to secure to the consumer
this protection. U.S. v. Antikamnia Chemical Co., 231 U.S. 654 (1913); Hall-Baker Grain Co.
v. U.S., 198 Fed. 614, 616 (C. C. A. 8th 1912).
8 The proposals for a new food and drugs act which are referred to are the three Copeland
bills, S. 1944, 73d Cong., ist Sess.; S. 2800, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.; and S. 5, 74th Cong., ist Sess.
In addition to these bills a number of others have been introduced including the Boland bill,
H. R. 8316, 73 d Cong., 2d Sess.; the Jenckes bill, H. R. 7964, 73 d Cong., 2d Sess.; the McCarran bill, S. 2858, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.; the Stephens bill S.2355, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.; the Black
bill, H. R. 6376, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.; the Mead bill, H. R. 3972, 74th Cong., ist Sess.; the
McCarran bill, S. 58o, 74th Cong., ist Sess.
948 Stat. 195 (i933), i5 U.S.C.A. § 701 (1934).
'0 48 Stat. 3 (1933), 7 U.S.C.A. § 6oi (1934).
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commensurate with price paid. Accordingly, those acts contain specific
provisions directed at protecting the ultimate consumer from too rapid an
acceleration of the rise in the price level." However, it is clear that the
protection thus afforded makes no provision for securing to a consumer
intrinsic value comparable to price.
To afford the consumer adequate protection of this character, it has
been suggested that there be established by federal legislation a system of
standards and grades of quality and that products be graded according to
those standards. 2 One of the respects in which the proposals for a new
food and drug act differ from the existing act is in the provision they make
for such a scheme of standardization of quality. 13 Pending the consideration of the proposed act, attempts have been made to utilize the National
Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act to secure
to consumers this type of protection.4 Thus some of the codes of fair
competitioh put into force by the National Recovery Administration have
incorporated standards and grades of quality.,' In like manner, some of
" N. I. R. Act, § 3 (a), 48 Stat. 196 (933), iS U.S.C.A.
48 Stat. 32 (1933), 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 602-603 (1934).

§ 703

(1934); Ag. Adj. Act,

§ 2 (3),

12As to the need for standards and grades of quality, see Brady, Standards and the Consumer, Consumers' Advisory Board, National Recovery Administration (Mar. 7, 1934) (mimeographed); Coles, Standardization of Consumers' Goods (1932), 257-259; Standards of Quality,
Bull. No. 3, Consumers' Div., National Emergency Council (June 1934); O'Brien, Standards for
Consumers' Goods, Bureau of Home Economics, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (Sept. 25, 1934)
(mimeographed); Kallet and Schlink, ioo,ooo,ooo Guinea Pigs (1933), 288-29o; Lynd, Why
the Consumer Wants Quality Standards, 26 Advertising and Selling (Jan. 4, 1934); Edwards,
Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Commerce on S. 2800, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(U934), 90o-93; Kallet, id. 308-3M1

13Thus the Copeland bills provide: "The Secretary is hereby authorized to fix, establish
and promulgate definitions of identity and standards of quality and fill of container for any
food." S. i944, § II, 73d Cong., ist Sess. (i933).

"For the effectuation of the purposes of this Act the Secretary is hereby authorized to promulgate regulations, as provided by Section 22, fixing and establishing for any food (i) a definition and standard of identity, and (2) one objectively determinable minimum standard of quality and fill of container." S.2800, § i, 73 d Cong., 2d Sess. (r934).
"For the effectuation of the purposes of this Act the Secretary is hereby authorized to promulgate regulations, as provided by sections 7oi and 703, fixing and establishing for any food a
definition and standard of identity, and a reasonable standard of quality and/or fill of container: Provided, That no standard of quality shall be established for any fresh natural food."
S. 5,

§ 303,

74

th Cong., ist Sess. (1935).

See address of Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., The Consumer's Place in the Organization of the
New Deal, Agricultural Adjustment Administration Release n. 1272-35, Dec. 29, 1934; Flynn
and Lynd, The New Deal and the Consumer, Consumers' Research, Inc. (Mar. 1934) (pamphlet); Means, The Consumer and the New Deal, 173 Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and
Soc. Sci. 7 (1934).
"Macaroni Industry Code, art. VII, § 3, approved jan. 29, x934, approved Code no. 234;
Supplementary Code for the Blue Crab Industry, art. VI, § x (j), approved May 5, 1934, ap'4
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the marketing agreements and licenses issued by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration have also included among their provisions terms
providing for the establishment of standards and grades of quality.,6 But
adequate protection is not being secured by codes of fair competition and
marketing agreements, not all of which have such provisions."1 Nor is this
surprising, since it was not intended that such protection be afforded by
the emergency agencies. Indeed, it is questionable whether such provision
for the protection of the consumer is properly a subject for treatment in
codes and agreements. It seems clear that until legislation expressly providing for a complete and thorough system of sfandards and grades of
quality is enacted the desired results cannot be realized. 8
Before proceeding to consider proposed legislation designed to afford
the consumer this protection, it may be desirable to see whether any such
protection is afforded him at present. The present Food and Drugs Act 9
offers some protection which is, however, extremely limited in nature and
effectiveness. The Act seeks merely to prevent the sale of adulterated
articles and to prohibit misbranding. By forbidding the sale of adulterated
articles it is intended to protect the consumer at least against the purchase
of an article he clearly would not be willing to buy. Provisions with respect to misbranding will, among other things, prevent the consumer
from buying a product under the mistaken idea that he is buying another
product and will also prevent misstatements as to quality and ingredients.
It is obvious, however, that the adulteration provision does not afford the
consumer any assurance that he will receive a product of any particular
grade or quality. Nor will like protection be made possible by the provisions against misbranding. There are only a few instances in which legislation has provided for the establishment of a standard or standards of
quality. The Tea Importation Act 20 provides that the Secretary of Agriproved Code no. 308; Dog Food Industry Code, art. VII, § i, approved May 31, 1934, approved Code no. 450. See generally, Standards of Quality, ii, Bull. no. 3, Consumers' Div.,
National Emergency Council (June 1934).
16 Marketing Agreement for Shippers of Oranges and Grapefruit Grown in the State of
Texas, art. III, Agreement no. 33, approved Dec. 22, 1933; Marketing Agreement for Shippers
of Fresh Lettuce, Peas and Cauliflower Grown in Western Washington, art. VII, Agreement
no. 49, approved July 17, 1934; Marketing Agreement for Shippers of Florida Strawberries, art.
V, Agreement no. So, approved Aug. 1, 1934; Marketing Agreement for the Watermelon Industry in the Southeastern States, art. V, Agreement no. 52, approved Aug. 6, 1934.
'7 See Brady, Standards and the Consumer, Consumers' Advisory Board, National Recovery Administration (Mar. 7, 1934) (mimeographed).
18Supra note 12.
1934 Stat. 768 (igo6), 21 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1927).
20 29 Stat. 604, 6o5, §§ i, 3 (r897), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 41, 43 (r927).
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culture shall establish standards of purity, quality and fitness for consumption of tea which is to be imported into the United States and prohibits the importation of any tea which fails to come up to the standards
set. The Butter Act of March 4, 1923, provides that "'butter' shall be
understood to mean the food product usually known as butter, and which
is made exclusively from milk or cream, or both, with or without common
salt, and with or without additional coloring matter, and containing not
less than 8o per centum by weight of milk fat, all tolerances having been
allowed for. ' '2 The McNary-Mapes Amendment to the Food and Drugs
Act provides that the Secretary of Agriculture may set a standard of quality, condition and/or fill of container for canned food products other than
meat and milk and requires that any canned product which fails to come
up to "a reasonable standard of quality, condition, and/or fill of container
for each class of canned food as will, in his judgment, promote honesty and
fair dealing in the interest of the consumer" shall bear upon its package or
label a plain and conspicuous statement prescribed by the Secretary of
22
Agriculture indicating that such canned food falls below such standard.
There are other statutes providing for the establishment of standards and
grades of quality.2 3 These, however, are not designed for the protection of
the ultimate consumer. To aid in the administration and enforcement of
the present act some machinery for the establishment of standards has
been devised. A Food Standards Committee in the Food and Drugs Administration has been in existence since 1914. Standards for a number of
foods have in fact been fixed. However, these standards which are contained in various official publications of the Food and Drugs Administration24 are purely advisory. They are not set pursuant to any statutory
authority and therefore have no binding effect on anyone. They are for2142 Stat. 15oo (1923), 21 U.S.C.A. § 6 (1927). The amendment of Aug. 3, 1912, 37 Stat.
§ 2, 21 U.S.C.A. § 20 (1927), canhardlybe considered as providing for standards of quality

250,

in the sense used herein.
22 46 Stat. 1019 (1930),

21

U.S.C.A. § io (i934).

23 See, for example, Cotton Futures Act, 39 Stat. 479, § 9 (i916), 26 U.S.C.A. § 740 (1927);
Cotton Standards Act, 42 Stat. i518, § 6 (1923), 7 U.S.C.A. § 56 (1927); Grain Standards Act,
39 Stat. 482, § 2 (1923), 7 U.S.C.A. § 74 (i927); Export Apple and Pear Act, 48 Stat. 123
(i933), 7 U.S.C.A. § 581 (1934); Tobacco Stock and Standards Act, 45 Stat. 1029 (1929),
7 U.S.C.A. § 5o (i934); Act of May i6, 1928,45 Stat. 539, making appropriations for Department of Agriculture for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1929, under which standards for grades
of vealers and slaughter calves and for grades of veal and calf carcasses have been set. Service
and Regulatory Announcements, nos. 113, 114, Bureau of Agricultural Economics (Sept. 1928).
24Food Inspection Decisions, and Service and Regulatory Announcements. In addition
standards have been set by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and appear in the Service
and Regulatory Announcements of the Bureau.
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mulated merely to serve as guides in the enforcement of the adulteration
and misbranding provisions and as some indication that conformity thereto will be accepted as compliance with the provisions of the Food and
Drugs Act. That they are, therefore, wholly inadequate for the purpose
in hand is apparent and well recognized.
In addition to the reasons already advanced for the need of establishing
standards of quality, there is the further consideration that standards are
essential for the proper enforcement of any food and drug legislation.25
The Food and Drugs Act, which merely prohibits the sale of adulterated
products, presents insuperable obstacles to proper enforcement becauseit
contains no indication of the standard, a deviation from which constitutes
adulteration.21 Furthermore, the prohibition of misbranding means little
unless there is provided, at the same time, a definition of the properly
branded article.27 In consequence, no standards are provided by which a
court may judge whether a product is in fact adulterated or misbranded.
The result is that each case must stand upon its own factsP5 and the government is obliged to use numerous experts and scientific data to indicate
the proper standard and to prove that there was a departure therefrom.
That this is both expensive and extremely burdensome is plain. That the
lack of standards is a serious handicap to enforcement has been repeatedly
emphasized.29 Recently the character of that handicap was again pointed
2s Crawford, Technical Problems in Food and Drugs Law Enforcement, i Law and Contemporary Problems 36 (1933); Hayes and Ruff, Administration of Federal Food and Drugs
Act, i Law and Contemporary Problems 16 (933).
26 See, for example, F. B. Washburn & Co. v. U.S., 224 Fed. 395 (C.C.A. ist igrs); 32 Col.
L. Rev. 723 (1932).
27 See U.S. v. One Car Load of Como H. & M. Feed, 188 Fed. 453, 456 (N.D. Ala. 1i1i);
32 Col. L. Rev. 723 (1932). It is likely that definitions of identity will prevent practices such
as that disclosed in U.S. v. American Druggists' Syndicate, 186 Fed. 387 (E. D. N.Y. 1911).
28 See Fisher, The Proposed Food and Drugs Act: A Legal Critique, i Law and Contemporary Problems 74, 102 (1933); Campbell, Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on
Commerce on S. 1944, 73 d Cong., 2d Sess. (i933), 35-36.
:9 In his annual report for the year 1913, the Secretary of Agriculture stated:

"The establishment of legal standards for judging foods would render the food and drugs
act more effective, less expensive in its administration, and supply needed legal criteria. Under
present conditions it is necessary in the individual prosecution to establish by evidence a standard for each individual article. This procedure is very expensive, and sometimes its cost is out
of proportion to its value. Moreover, it may result in lack of uniformity in different jurisdictions. With legal standards established, the control of foods would be more uniform and measurably less expensive. The lack of suck standards is to-day one of the greatest diffic dties in the
administratiot of thefood and drugs act." (Italics supplied.) Rep. Sec. Agriculture (1913), i8;
id. (1916), 36.
See also Hearings before Committee on Agriculture on H. R. 8954, proposing amendments
to the Food and Drugs Act, 66th Cong., ist Sess. (1919), 51-52; Campbell, Hearings before
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out by- the chief of the Food and Drug Administration in his annual
report:
"The present law gives the Department of Agriculture no authority to establish
legal standards for food products, except in the limited field of canned goods. The food
standards announced by the Department are wholly advisory in character and compliance is a voluntary matter on the part of the manufacturer. Such advisory standards
are based upon the consensus of consumer understanding and upon good manufacturing practice. To prove that a product sold within the jurisdiction of the Food and
Drugs Act and that fails to comply with the advisory standard is adulterated or misbranded, it is necessary for the Department to present to the court and jury convincing evidence that the advisory standard does represent the actual composition of
the product expected by the consumer and recognized by the majority of the trade.
Proof that the food on trial does not meet the advisory standard is of no avail unless
the validity of the standard is first established. This imposes a double burden of proof
upon the government as well as the expense of bringing into court trade and consumer
witnesses who are prepared to testify that the advisory standard accurately represents
the material in question. It has long been recognized that this necessity imposes a
handicap of undue proportions upon the government and that the lack of legal standards is a distinct disadvantage to ethical manufacturers who are forced to compete
with products which differ from the advisory standards. The establishment of food
standards having the force and effect of law will vastly simplify the problem of enforcement and will unquestionaly be of great advantage to the consuming public and
to the manufacturer of legal products."3o

Despite the clear advantages which have been shown will derive from
a system of standards and grades of quality, there has long been tremendous opposition to its establishment. As far back as i9o6 when the
present act was passed an attempt was made to incorporate therein
authority to set up standards. The movement was successfully opposed
and the provisions with respect thereto were deleted. The character of
the objections interposed is well indicated by the following statement
made on the floor of the Senate:
"We absolutely refused in enacting the Pure Food Law to consider favorably the
proposition of establishing standards by legislation. It is the spirit of the Pure Food

Bill that the courts should determine these questions (of adulteration and misbrandSubcommittee of Committee on Commerce on S.2800, 73 d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), 597-599;
Howard, Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Commerce on S.5, 74 th Cong., ist
Sess. (i935), i8o.
The lack of any standards in the English Food and Drugs Act has also been recognized as
hindering the effective enforcement of that act. A Plea for a Legal Standard under the Sale of
Food and Drugs Act, 35 Law Mag. and Rev. 398 (5th Series, igio); Standards of Quality in
Articles of Food, 75 Justice of the Peace 362 (i9ii); Standardization to Cope with Adulteration, 74 Sol. J. 241 (1930); 163 L. T. 432 (1927).
3o Report of the Chief of the Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture
(1933), 14,1I5.
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ing) and that no other definition than that of the courts should constitute a rule or
action under the law; .... It was the essence of that principle in the Pure Food Law
that as much as anything else held it back in Congress by about a quarter of a century.
People would not submit to the principle that we should establish standards by legislation. The people who intelligently considered that measure demanded that each case
should stand upon its own facts."3y

It is not intended to suggest that the many contentions which have
been advanced in opposition to a system of standards are devoid of merit.
The difficulty of formulating a complete set of standards and grades 32 and
the magnitude of the enforcement problem are not denied. Nor can one
overlook the presence of the traditional fear of business of government
regulation. But it is not proposed to analyze and consider the validity of
these and of other objections which have been raised. 3 3 On the contrary,
it is proposed to do no more than examine some of the more important
legal problems which are presented by legislation designed to realize the
many advantages to be derived from a system of standards and grades.

II
The initial question, obviously, is to what extent shall the legislation
provide for the setting up of such a system. Shall it merely provide for
definitions of identity? Shall it provide for one minimum standard of
3143 Cong. Rec. 136o (igog).
large number of standards which have in fact been set and the wide variety of food
products to which they apply are disclosed by the Food and Drug Administration's Service
and Regulatory Announcements, no. 2, rev. 4, issued in August, 1933, and no. 4, rev. 2, issued
in August, x932, and by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics' Check List of Standards for
Farm Products Formulated by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
33 It has often been contended that the establishment of grades will lead manufacturers to
produce down to the limit of the grade or standard. Testimony of Dr. Alsberg, Hearings before
Committee on Agriculture on H. R. 8954, proposing amendments to the Food and Drugs Act,
66th Cong., ist Sess. (i919), 49-5o. Not only is experience to the contrary but also it will still
be possible for manufacturers to compete on the basis of quality above the minimum level
for each grade. Brady, Industrial Standardization, 206, 207, National Industrial Conference
Board (1929); Coles, Standardization of Consumers' Goods (1932), I84-185. Furthermore, it
should be noted that compliance with standards will not relieve from the need of complying
with the adulteration provisions of the act and that, therefore, grading down by means of
adulteration will not be tolerated. Henningsen Produce Co. v. Whaley, 238 Fed. 650 (D.C.
32The

Mont. 1917); U.S. v. Six Barrels of Ground Pepper, 253 Fed. 199 (S.D. N.Y. 1917); U.S. v. 154
Sacks of Oats, 283 Fed. 985 (W.D. Va. 1922); St. Louis v. Kruempeler, 235 Mo. 710, 139 S.W.
466 (I911).

For a host of other objections advanced against the adoption of standards of quality see
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce on S. 2800, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934), 92, 176-77, 18o,

220,

624-625; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
201-205, 205-206. Most of the ob-

on Commerce on S.5, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (x935), 48-49,
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quality? Shall it go so far as to provide for the setting up of a complete
system of grades? Definitions of identity will eliminate the problem of
first determining what the particular product involved is. No longer will
a court, in a prosecution for adulteration or misbranding, be compelled in
the first instance to determine whether a particular article is or is not a
macaroon. 34 It is patent that definitions of identity, by setting the test
by which products are identified, are the foundation upon which any system of standards or grades of quality must be constructed. But they give
the consumer no means for ascertaining the quality of any particular unit
of that product. Therefore, they do not indicate whether the product is
even of sufficiently high quality to be satisfactory for its customary use.
This is the function of minimum standards of quality, though it may well
be that such a standard will coincide with the definition of identity.
Whether the sale of products which fail to meet the minimum requirements is to be prohibited or to be circumscribed by the requirement that
its substandard character be made known need not here be considered. 35
But minimum standards also do not afford adequate protection of pocketbook because the consumer does not know what the quality of a product
is, other than that it measures up to that minimum standard. From the

point of view of quality, the major part of the field is left unrestricted.
This compels the conclusion that the marking off of this field by a series of
grades is essential if adequate protection is to be provided. It conclusively
jections advanced are answered in the hearings on the bills, Hearings on S. 2800, supra, 82,
90-93, 163, 241-242, 3o8, 312-313, 598; Hearings on S. 5, suspra, io5-io9, 212-214; or are incidentally discussed or disposed of elsewhere in the article.
14F. B.

Washburn & Co. v. U.S. 224 Fed. 395 (C.C.A. ist 1915).
It has been argued that whether or not the sale of substandard products is to be prohibited should be entirely a matter of health protection. If such goods are not in fact injurious to health and every attempt is made to inform the purchaser of their substandard character, it may be to the economic benefit of a large class of consumers to permit their sale.
Nolan v. Morgan, 69 F. (2d) 471 (C.C.A. 7th 1934). Where these conditions are met the
McNary-Mapes Amendment, 21 U.S.C.A. § IO (5) ('934) permits the sale of substandard
canned foods. The failure of the Tea Act to allow the importation and sale of tea of inferior
quality, though not injurious to health, Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (I9O4); Buttfield
v. Bidwell, 96 Fed. 328 (C.C.A. 2d i899), has been adversely criticized. Alsberg, Economic
Consequences of Commodity Control, i Law and Contemporary Problems 44 (1933). See also
Weber, The Food, Drug and Insecticide Administration (1928), 5o.
The difficulty of informing consumers by labels or other means is a factor which must be
taken into account, Houston v. St. Louis Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479 (1919).
It should be noted that where the minimum standard of quality is identical with the definition of identity, the problem of substandard products does not arise. See Copeland, Hearings
before the Committee on Commerce on S. 2800, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), 89-9o; and Campbell, id., 598-599.
3s
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appears, therefore, that a comprehensive scheme of consumer protection
must embrace definitions of identity, minimum standards of quality, and
grades. 36 Affording the consumer this protection by legislation apparently
is justified in the light of the numerous statements made by courts that a
37
purchaser is entitled to know what he is getting.
Assuming that it has been determined to do so, there would seem to be
no legal obstacle to providing the statutory machinery necessary for the
formulation and establishment of standards and grades, Congress having
ample power by virtue of the interstate commerce clause. 38 Legislation
providing for that statutory machinery may take one of two forms. The

act may set the standard or may provide for its setting. Acts which set
standards may do so in either of two ways. The act itself may contain
precise definitions of identity and/or standards of quality as does the
Butter Act of March 4, 1923.39 Or it may provide that specified definitions

of identity and standards of quality already established shall be the
standards to which products must conform. 40 The Food and Drugs Act
36 Observe however, the change which has been made in the standards provision of the Copeland Bill. Under S. 1944 standards were to include: "Definitions of identity and standards of
quality, and fill of container for any food." The provision in S. 5 provides: "for any food a
definition and standard of identity, and a reasonable standard of quality and/or fill of container: Provided, that no standard of quality shall be established for any fresh natural food.'!
37 U.S. v. Antikamnia Chemical Co., 231 U.S. 654 (1914); U.S. v. 4o Barrels and 20 Kegs of
Coca-Cola, 215 Fed. 535 (C.C.A. 6th 1914); U.S. v. oo Cases of Tepee Apples, 179 Fed. 985
(W. D. Mo. igo8); People v. Van Kampen, 21o N.Y. 381, 104 N.E. 942 (914).
31 See Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (i9o4); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. rs,
128 (1913); Seven Cases v. U.S., 239 U.S. 510 (1915); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249
U.S. 427 (919).

Due process is not violated by such legislation. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242
U.S. 153 (i916); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912); Lieberman v. Van de Carr, i99 U.S. 552,
562 (i9o5); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (95); Merchant's Exchange Bank of St. Louis v.
Missouri, 248 U.S. 365 (1918). See also Crescent Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 233 Fed. 282
(N.D. N.Y. i916); Marshall v. Dept. of Agriculture of Idaho, 44 Idaho 440, 258 Pac. 17i
(1927); State v. Aslesen, 50 Minn. 5, 52 N.W. 220 (1892); Village of Herkimer v. Potter, 124
Misc. 57, 207 N.Y.S. 35 (1924); People v. Wilson and Co., 138 Misc. 440, 246 N.Y.S., iiu
(1930).
39 42 Stat. i5oo (1923), 21 U.S.C.A. §6 (1927). For similar statutes see Ala. Gen. Laws
(1923), no. 376, art. 6, § io (ice cream); Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering 1931), art. 28o8a, § 2; Ky.
Stat. (Carroll, Baldwin's Rev. 1930), 99 I905a-i92o (apples); Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 94,
9H r3, 74 (milk, fish); N.Y. Cahill's Consol. Laws (1930), c. i, § 207 (vinegar); Ore. Laws
(930), c. ii6, § i (butter); Tex. Stat. (1928), art. zio-ii6 (peaches, tomatoes, Bermuda
onions, snap beans, Bartlett pears and Irish potatoes).
Cal. Gen. Laws (1931), art. 57, § 3; Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. (i919), § 2044; Idaho Code Ann.
tit. 36, §315; Va. Code (Supp. 1926), § 1185.
Some statutes provide that the standards set by the local administrative body shall conform to those set by the United States Department of Agriculture. Iowa Code (1931), § 3059;
Ohio Ann. Code (Throckmorton, Baldwin's Rev. 1934), 9 1177-12. Ky. Stat. (Carroll, Bald40

(1932),
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which adopts the United States Pharmacopoeia as the standard for drugs
is an example of this kind of statute. 4' The second form which merely pro42
vides that standards shall be established is illustrated by the Tea Act.

For numerous reasons the latter form is to be preferred. First, the formulation and establishment of standards and grades is for the most part
a problem for the scientist and technician. The mere enumeration of some
of the technical problems which must first be solved suffices to demonstrate this conclusion. 43 First, on the basis of what factors, attributes,
properties or characteristics is a particular product to be graded? With
reference to what are grades to be determined-usefulness for a specific
purpose or relative superiority expressed in terms of a score or rating
based upon numerical values assigned to each of the characteristics of the
product selected? The answer may depend on the nature of each particular product. One or the other type of grading may be necessary in the
case of some products. Either may be used in the case of others. If grades
win's Rev. i93o), § 2o6oa-2o68, which provides for the establishment of standards by the
State Board of Health, contains a proviso that "when the standard or nomenclature for any
food or food product has been determined by the Supreme Court of the United States such
standard or nomenclature shall govern in the enforcement of the provisions of this act."
The validity of statutes adopting the United States Pharmacopoeia as a standard of
strength and purity has been upheld, State v. Hutchinson, 55 Ohio 573, 46 N.E. 71 (1897),
State v. Williams, 93 Minn. 155, oo N.W. 641 (i9o4); American Linseed Oil Co. v. Wheaton,
25 S.D. 6o, 125 N.W. 127 (igio), as hav6 statutes adopting the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture
standards, Cleveland Macaroni Co. v. State Board of Health, 256 Fed. 376 (N.D. Cal. 9ig);
People v. Wilson & Co., 138 Misc. 440, 246 N.Y.S. i i i (193o).
4' 34 Stat. 769, § 6 (19o6), 21 U.S.C.A. § 7 (i927).
4229 Stat. 604, § 1 (1897), 21 U.S.C.A. § 4, (1927). For similar statutes see Conn. Gen.
Stat. (i93o), § 2o6o; Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923), c. 65, § 613, but adopts standards of United
States Department of Agriculture until others are fixed by the State Board of Health; Ky.
Stat. (Carroll, Baldwin's Rev. 1930), § 2o6oa-2o68; N.C. Ann. Code (1931), § 4764.
43 For discussion of the technical problems and difficulties encountered in the establishment
of standards, including problems of revision, tolerances, and tests, see Brady, Industrial
Standardization, 17, i5g-i6r, National Industrial Conference Board (1929) (agricultural
products); Standards of Quality, 7, Bull. No. 3, Consumers' Div., National Emergency Council (June, 1934); Harriman, Standards and Standardization (1928), 92-93, I3o-3i; Olsen,
Development of Federal Standards for the Certification of Farm Products in the United
States, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (Aug. 1930) (mimeographed); Coles, Standardization of Consumers' Goods (1932), 77-114, 128-139, 201-203;
Holden, Agricultural Standardization on the Pacific Coast, 137 Annals of Amer. Acad. of Pol.,
and Soc. Sci. 107 (1928); Tenny, Standardization of Farm Products, 137 Annals of Amer.
Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci. 205 (1928); Present Guides for Household Buying, Misc. Pub. no.
193, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (April 1934); Tenny, National Standards for Farm Products,
Circ. No. 8, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (May 1930); Kitchen, Standardization and Inspection
of Farm Products, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (Dec. 1932)
(mimeographed); Brooks, Critical Studies in the Legal Chemistry of Foods (1928).
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are to be determined on the basis of ratings and if, for example, the moisture content of the product be accorded a weight of twenty per cent in that
rating, how is the moisture content of any particular unit of that product
to be measured? Can it be measured, and, if so, what test is to be used in
its measurement? Secondly, while it is true that such standards as have
already been scientifically determined may be incorporated in the act, to
the extent that scientific standards have not as yet been formulated or
that particular products may not be susceptible of precise grading, the
statute either cannot specify the standards or, if it attempts to do so,
runs the risk that the standards so set for the first time may subsequently
prove to be faulty. Thirdly, there is the need of providing for deviations
and tolerances, many of which may be unknown at the time the particular
standard is set. Fourthly, since a standard can be set only with reference
to those characteristics of a product which it is desirable or feasible to
take into account at a particular time, there is constant need for revision.
New materials are produced; new processes of manufacture or production
are devised; new uses are discovered. The rigidity which results from
enactment into law might require the use of an obsolete standard. That
statutes may be revised is no answer. It is well known that statutes are
seldom submitted to constant revision. Furthermore, even were conscientious efforts made to keep the statute abreast of scientific and technical
progress, changes must wait upon legislative sessions whereas a particular
standard may become obsolete over night. It therefore appears that the
legislators' function is limited to providing that mechanism which will
best serve the purpose of the scientist or technician. Any attempt to set out
standards in the act itself might seriously limit the effectiveness of a system of standards and grades. Moreover, while there are statutes which set
out standards for particular products, 44 the legislative task involved in the
enactment of a statute which would contain precise definitions of identity
and standards of quality for all food and drug products would be
enormous.
It must be admitted, however, that there is at least one positive advantage in a statute which sets standards. That advantage is the certainty which is lent by the fact that the requirements are absolutely fixed. 4s
Nor is this assurance of small concern to business men. 4 6 Industry cannot
afford to be exposed to the risk, slight though it may be, of sudden and
44 See supra note 39.
4s See St. Louis v. Liessing, i9 Mo. 464, 89 S.W. 61i (i9o5).
46See Burton, What the Food Manufacturer Thinks of S. 1944, 1 Law and Contemporary
Problens i2o (1933).
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frequent changes in the standards to which products must conform. The
expense, inconvenience and, on occasion, the inability of adjusting productive processes to meet new requirements, as well as the possibility of
loss resulting from contracts for the purchase or sale of products produced
pursuant to existing requirements, constitute a burden which cannot frequently be imposed. It is questionable, however, whether this consideration is sufficiently persuasive to compel the adoption of a statute which
contains standards, particularly in view of the fact that it is possible to
accomplish the same end even though a statute merely provides for the
setting of standards. Thus it is a simple matter to insert a provision limiting the frequency with which revisions might be made and requiring that
adequate notice of any change be given before it becomes effective.
The desirability of the legislation merely providing that standards shall
be fixed is not offset by the possible contention that standards set in the
act have greater validity because of that fact. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has, consistently with its well-established doctrine that it
will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of officers charged with
the administration of an act, refused to review administrative standards
fixed pursuant to statutory authority. Thus, for example, in Houston v.
St. Louis PackingCo., 47 it refused to investigate the validity of a standard
48
fixed by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Meat Inspection Act,
where the record showed substantial evidence supporting the conclusion
of the Secretary. This conclusion obtains despite such decisions as are illustrated by the recent case of Nolan v. Morgan49 in which the Circuit
Court of Appeals set aside as arbitrary and unreasonable a minimum
standard of quality for canned peas, promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture pursuant to the authority granted by the McNary-Mapes
amendment. Whether or not the decision is in conflict with the views ex47 249 U.S. 479 (1919). See also U.S. v. Lexington Mill Co., 232 U.S. 399,405 (1914); U.S. v.
Shreveport Grain and Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932); U.S. v. Frank, I8 9 Fed. I95 (S.D.
Ohio 1911); Armbruster v. Mellon, 41 F. (2d) 430 (App. D.C. 1930). But see St. Louis v. Liessing, 190 Mo. 464, 89 S.W. 61i (i9o5); People v. Cipperly, io N.Y. 634, 4 N.E. 107 (1886).
In an attempt to insure that standards set by administrative officers will be accepted as
primafacie evidence of the proper standards, the following provisions have been inserted in
statutes. N.Y. Cahill's Consol. Laws (1930), fit. I, § x6o (b) provides that "All rules, regulations and standards of quality and size or weight established under the authority of this statute
shall have the force of law." N.C. Ann. Code (193i), § 4764 provides that the Board of Agriculture shall fix and publish standards "and these standards, when so published, shall be the
standards before all courts." The same provision appears in Va. Code (Supp. 1926), § i 85.
4834 Stat. I26O (1907), 2I U.S.C.A. § 71 (1927).
4969 F. (2d) 471 (C. C. A. 7th 1934). The court's ground for holding invalid the standard set
by the Secretary was that it bore no relationship to the protection of either health or pocketbook.
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pressed by the Supreme Court, is for the present, beside the point. It does
not indicate that legislative standards have any greater force than those
set by administrative officers. It may be that administrative standards
will be subjected to more careful scrutiny.0 There are, however, numerous examples of legislative standards which received the same fate at the
hands of a court as was accorded the standard of the Secretary of Agriculture in the Nolan case.5' The mere enactment into law of a standard or

test will not make it immune from attack on the ground of its unreasonableness.52
Another alleged claim of superiority for legislative standards as compared to those set by administrative officers is that the former are not
open to the objection that they are in excess of the authority granted by
the Act. Administrative standards have, in fact, been set aside on this
ground3 M
While it is true that this is inherent in the case of any legislative
delegation of authority, the increasing tendency to resort to administrative rather than legislative regulation clearly indicates that this is an obso The recent case of Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 2 U.S. Law Week 4o9 (1935), does not
conflict with the position advanced herein, although it may be necessary for Congress to indicate with greater precision the guides and considerations to be taken into account in the formulation of the administrative standards.
"U.S. v. Carolene Products, 7 F. Supp. 5oo (S.D. Ill. 1934); People v. Excelsior Bottling
Works, 184App. Div. 45, 71 N.Y.S. 733 (I918); People v. Jacobowitz, 224 App. Div. iir, 229
N.Y.S. 369 (1928).
S2 That either legislative or administrative standards or grades must meet the judicial concept of reasonableness is plain. The reasonableness of legislative and administrative standards
has been considered in the following cases: W. B. Wood Mfg. Co. v. U.S., 292 Fed. 133 (C.C.A.
8th 1923); Ex parte Mefford, iio Cal. App. i, 292 Pac. 988 (1930) (statute providing that
standards for citrus fruits might vary with respect to the locality in which the fruits were
grown and the time they were picked); Exparte Hayes, 134 Cal. App. 312, 25 P. (2d) 230 (1933);
Marshall v. Dept. of Agriculture of Idaho, 44 Idaho 440, 258 Pac. 171 (1927) (number and
range of grades); St. Louis v. Liessing, i9o Mo. 464, 89 S.W. 6i (z9os); People v. Excelsior
Bottling Works, 184 App. Div. 45, 171 N.Y.S. 733 (1918) (statute prohibiting the use of saccharine in the manufacture of carbonated waters); People v. Jacobowitz, 224 App. Div. iii,
229 N.Y.S. 369 (1928) (statute indirectly preventing the use of saccharine in the manufacture
of carbonated waters). See also Fisher, The Proposed Food and Drugs Act: A Legal Critique,
i Law and Contemporary Problems 74, io8 (i933).
It is to be noted that because of the attack made in the hearings on S. '944 and S. 28oo
with respect to the reasonableness of administrative standards, § 303 of the latest Copeland
bill, S. 5, provides for the establishment of "a reasonable standard of quality." See also § 702
which provides that the district courts may enjoin the enforcement of any regulation "if it is
shown that the regulation is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, in the light of the facts, or
not in accordance with law, and that the petitioner may suffer substantial damage by reason
of its enforcement."
53 Macy v. Browne, 224 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 2d i915); affd. in Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 6o6
(1918); Lynch v. Tilden Co., 265 U.S. 315 (1924); U.S. v. ii,i5o Pounds of Butter, 195 Fed.
657 (C. C. A. 8th 1912).
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jection not worthy of serious consideration. Moreover, by drafting the
legislation in a form which, within the limits of a proper delegation of legislative authority, gives the administrative officer the widest amount of
latitude in the formulation of standards, the likelihood of difficulty on
this score may be minimized. That an administrative officer in promulgating a standard might fail to confine it within the limits of the statute is
hardly a justifiable criticism of the mechanism selected but rather indi4
cates the need for greater precision in the formulation of the standard5
In this connection, it should be noted that there is no doubt as to the
validity of a provision authorizing administrative officers to fix and estab5
lish standards of quality.1

A third consideration which might be urged in favor of the adoption of
legislative standards is that when a legislature adopts a standard it can do
so with reference to such scientific data as it may choose to examine and
upon the basis of whatever scientific principle it may deem fit, whereas it
has no assurance that the administrative officer or agency to which the
power to fix standards has been delegated will do so upon the basis of any
6
scientific principle or even with reference to any scientific data at all.s
Although it is extremely unlikely that an administrative officer would
deign to set standards without full consideration of such scientific and
s4 An example of the need for greater precision in the formulation of standards is illustrated
by Macy v. Browne, 224 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 2d I915); affd. in Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 6o6
(1918). A regulation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue which set up standards of quality, purity, fitness for consumption and maximum coloring matter content was held not to be
authorized by the Tea Importation Act which provided that standards should be set with
reference to quality, purity and fitness for consumption. It would seem, since the statute did
not provide for a standard with respect to the amount of coloring matter, that under the circumstances either the standard of purity or the standard of quality might have been so defined
as to include coloring matter as one of the factors on the basis of which purity or quality was
to be determined.
ss Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (igog); U.S. v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. So6 (IgII); U.S.
v. Shreveport Grain aid Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932); U.S. v. 420 Sacks of Flour, iSo Fed.
518 (E. D. La. igio). In Marshall v. Dept. of Agriculture of Idaho, 44 Idaho 44o, 258 Pac. 171
(1927), a statute delegating to the State Department of Agriculture the power to put into
operation a system of grades for farm products was held not to be an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority.
56Some statutes, however, have gone quite far in designating the factors to be taken into
account. Thus the Cotton Futures Act, 39 Stat. 479,481, § 9 (1916), 26 U.S.C.A. § 740 (1928),
provides that the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized "to establish and promulgate standards
of cotton by which its quality or value may be judged or determined, including its grade, length
of staple, strength of staple, color, and such other qualities, properties, and conditions as may
be standardized in practical form." Ore. Laws (I93x), c. 1i6 goes even further. Sec. 2 provides:
"All creamery butter manufactured or sold in the State of Oregon shall be graded upon a
possible ioo points as follows: i. Flavor, 45 points. 2. Body and Texture, 25 points. 3. Color, iS points. 4. Salt, io points. 5. Package, 5 points."
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technical knowledge as is available, s7 it may be conceded that a statute
which failed to so provide could well be considered defective in this respect. While no federal statute provides that standards shall be scientifically determined, the latest proposal for a new food and drug act does
provide that standards may be promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture only after recommendation by a Food Standards Committee, public
hearing, and approval of a majority of the committee.s5 The procedure
required provides a check against arbitrary action by the official to whom
the authority is given but it offers little assurance that scientific principles
will be employed in the setting of the standard. No one of the members
of the committee "which shall consist of seven members, three of whom
shall be selected from the public, two from the food-producing, -processing, -manufacturing, and -distributing industry, and two from the Administration" is required to be a scientist s9 Assuming that such adequate
safeguards are included in the statute, the problem of determining the
agency to which the authority to establish standards shall be delegated
becomes largely academic.6° Whether it be an existing government agency
or, as has been suggested, a "Department of the Consumer" 6' or a "Consumers' Standards Bureau ' 62 is of no great concern.
III
Attention should now be directed to some provisions which are necessary to make effective the standards set in the manner described. The
.7 See Campbell, Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Commerce on S. i944,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (933), 36-37.
s S. 5, § 703(c), 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935).
The vesting of broad discretionary powers for the setting of standards in the Secretary of
Agriculture without any restrictions on its exercise or requirement that he exercise that power
is severely criticised, Kallet, A Consumer Looks at the Food and Drugs Bill, i Law and Contemporary Problems 126, 128 (1933). See also Kallet and Schlink, iooooo,ooo Guinea Pigs
(3933), 197-199.
s9 S. 5, § 703 (b), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (i935).
At least one other proposal is more thoroughgoing in this respect. "The Department of
Consumer Act," suggested by Consumers' Research (see infranote 6i), an unpublished draft
of which the authors have examined, provides that standards shall be set by a committee, the
members of which are required to be scientists. See Woodward, Hearings before Subcommittee
of Committee on Commerce on S. 1944, 73 d Cong., 2d Sess. (i933), 462.
60 But see Kallet, A Consumer Looks at the Food and Drugs Bill, i Law and Contemporary
Problems 126, 128-132 (i933); Kallet and Schlink, ioo,ooo,ooo Guinea Pigs (933), 197-199.
6z Supra note 59; Schlink, What Government Does and Might Do for the Consumer, 173
Annals of Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci. 125, 136 (i934).
62 Proposal to Develop Standards for Consumers' Goods, Committee on Consumer Standards, Consumers' Advisory Board, National Recovery Administration (Dec. i, 1933). Brady,
Standards and the Consumer, Consumers' Advisory Board, National Recovery Administration
(Mar. 7, 1934) (mimeographed).
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importance of the need of providing for the proper nomenclature to be employed in identifying the various grades cannot be overemphasized1 3
Grades devised primarily for consumer use and protection fail of their
function unless consumers are informed of the relative merits of one grade
as compared to another. This can be accomplished only by a proper system of nomenclature. An examination of some of the systems of nomenclature now in use clearly indicates their inadequacy. The use of superlatives and adjectives, implying varying degrees of excellence, such as
"choice," "extra choice," "fancy," "extra fancy," "prime" and "standard"--a system which, with variations, is frequently incorporated in legislation-is of little assistance in indicating relative quality. That such
terms may suggest one grade to one person and an entirely different one to
another is illustrated by the fact that the word "fancy" may mean first
grade in some instances, for example apples in Illinois, 6 4 or, as in the case
of asparagus in California, the sixth grade.6 Indeed, this may be true
with respect to a single product. Thus "fancy" apples are first grade in
some states 66 and second grade in others.6 7 Another example of a system
of nomenclature completely useless as a guide to grades is illustrated by
the employment of arbitrarily selected terms, such as "goose," "owl,"
"lark," and "falcon," terms which in no way are suggestive of the quality
of the article to which they are applied. 68 Another common practice
which is misleading and deceiving to consumers at present is the employment of "hidden" top grades. Thus in the case of one product the poorest
63 A Survey of the Terms Used in Designating Qualities of Goods, Consumers' Advisory
Board, National Recovery Administration (Sept. 1934); Coles, Standardization of Consumers'
Goods (1932), 82, io2; Brady, Industrial Standardization, 247, 248, National Industrial Conference Board (1929); Kitchen, Standardization and Inspection of Farm Products, 4, Bureau
of Agricultural Economics, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (Dec. 1932) (mimeographed); Harriman,
Standards and Standardization (1928), io8-iio; Baldwin, Hearings before Subcommittee of
Committee on Commerce on S. 5, 74 th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935), 36, 37.
64 l.

Stat. (1923), c. 5, § 33.

65A Survey of the Terms Used in Designating Qualities of Goods, 42, Consumers' Advisory
Board, National Recovery Administration (Sept. 1934).
6

Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), § 2070.
67Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering 1931), art. 2808a, § 2; A Survey of the Terms Used in Designating Qualities of Goods, 42, Consumers' Advisory Board, National Recovery Administration
Sept. 1934); Coles, Standardization of Consumers' Goods (1932), 195.
68A Survey of the Terms Used in Designating Qualities of Goods, 44, Consumers' Advisory
Board, National Recovery Administration (Sept. 1934). The names "Sunkist" and "Red
Ball" are used to indicate "Extra Choice" grade and "Choice" grade, respectively, of citrus
fruits. Agnew and McNair, Certification and Labeling Activities in 6o Commodity Fields, 3
American Standards Association Bulletin 7 (1932).
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grade is known as "best extra." 69 In the case of another the fifth grade is
called "Grade A-i," the other four grades being indicated as "Grade
AAAA," "Grade AA.A," "Grade AA" and "Grade A."'7° In order to protect
the consumer from such deceptions as these it would seem that the use of
either an alphabetical or a numerical system of grade designation, such as
A, B, C, D, etc. or i, 2, 3, 4, etc., with A or i, as the case may be, denoting
the top grade, should be made obligatory.7' The experience gained in the

administration of the Cotton Standards Act indicates that unless the
adoption of the system is made mandatory the use of present systems is
likely to be continued. 72 Such alphabetical and numerical nomenclature
systems have the virtue of being simple, flexible and easily remembered.
The statute should, however, provide for the possibility of the use of a different system where the nature of the product or the factors upon which
grades are based do not lend themselves either to numerical or to alphabetical designation.
The problem of revision of standards has already been touched upon.
The need for constant revision to keep up with scientific and technical
progress was one of the reasons urged against the incorporation of specific
standards in the statute itself. Where the statute does not contain the
69A Survey of the Terms Used in Designating Qualities of Goods, 47, Consumers' Advisory
Board, National Recovery Administration (Sept. 1934).
70 Id.

9. See also Coles, Standardization of Consumers' Goods

(1932), 154.

71If it were possible to so grade products, a system of indicating quality by means of numerical scores or ratings on the basis of zoo per cent would be equally, and perhaps even more
useful. The Cotton Standards Act, 42 Stat. 1517 (1923), 7 U.S C.A. § 52 (1927), prohibits, except where sales are made by sample, the use of any system of names, description or designation not used in the cotton standards set under the Act. A numerical system of grading is provided for in the standards set though each grade has an alternative descriptive name as well.
Service and Regulatory Announcement, no. 92, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S. Dept.

of Agriculture (Aug.

1925).

The need for requiring that "A" or "i" indicate the top grade and that letters or numbers
be used in order is illustrated by the provision therefor in the Naval Stores Act, 42 Stat. 1435,
§ 3 (1923), 7 U.S.C.A. § 93 (1927), which reads:
"The various grades of rosin, from highest to lowest, shall be designated, unless and until
changed, as hereinbefore provided, by the following letters, respectively: X, WW, WG, N, M,
K, I, H, G, F, E, D and B, together with the designation 'gum rosin' or wood rosin,' as the
case may be.
"The standards herein made and authorized to be made shall be known as the 'Official
Naval Stores Standards of the United States,' and may be referred to by the abbreviated
expression 'United States Standards,' and shall be the standards by which all naval stores in
commerce shall be graded and described."
7' A Survey of the Terms Used in Designating Qualities of Goods, 7, Consumers' Advisory
Board, National Recovery Administration (Sept. 1934).
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standards but provides for their promulgation by a designated administrative officer there would seem to be no need for a specific provision requiring periodic revision. On the contrary, it might be necessary to guard
against the possibility of sudden and excessive revision by the use of a device similar to that contained in the Cotton Futures Act 73 to the effect

that no revision can be made until after an existing standard has been in
force for some stated period of time or similar to that in the latest proposal
for a new food and drug act requiring notice and a hearing prior to the
adoption of any revised standard.7 4 If, however, the statute incorporates
standards or adopts those set or to be set by an independent agency, as for
example the Food and Drug Act which provides that the United States
Pharmacopoeia shall be the standard for drugs, then it may be necessary
to provide for periodic revision. The Pharmacopoeia is completely revised
only every ten years, though interim revisions are authorized, and it is
more than likely that technical advances will have the effect of making
some of the standards obsolete before the time a particular revision is
75
made.
The matter of tolerances and deviations must also be considered. The
difficulty of precisely measuring the quality of particular products, the
susceptibility of others to chemical changes due to the lapse of time or
change in climatic conditions, the divergent uses to which particular
products may be put, and the fact that despite honest efforts and the exercise of ordinary pre$caution a certain amount of error constantly occurs
indicates the need for permitting such limited departures from absolute
conformity to rigid standards as may be necessary. In consequence, it
seems desirable that the statute make provision for the fixing of tolerances
7339 Stat. 479, § 9 (i9x6), 26 U.S.C.A. § 740 (1928).
74 S. 5, § 7o3(c) 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). That section further provides that a regulation promulgated after notice and hearing "shall become effective on a date fixed by the Secretary, which date shall not be prior to ninety days after its promulgation." The Cotton Standards Act, 42 Stat. x5i8, § 6 (1923), 7 U.S.C.A. § 56 (1927), provides that the date on which a
standard or change or replacement shall become effective shall not be less than one year after
the date of the order establishing the standard, change or replacement. Ninety days notice is
required by the Grain Standards Act, 39 Stat. 482, § 2 (i916), U.S.C.A. § 74 (1927). The
Cotton Futures Act, 39 Stat. 479 § 9 (1916), 26 U.S.C.A. § 740 (2928), provides that no change
or replacement of any standard shall become effective until after one year's public notice.
75For this reason and also because of the situation which would be presented if the authority
to make ad interim revisions were revoked, Mr. Walter G. Campbell, Chief of the Food and
Drug Administration, Dept. of Agriculture, sought to justify § 4 (b) of S. 1944, which was designed to make it possible for the Secretary of Agriculture to provide methods for determination of the standards of quality, strength and purity of drug products to supplement those already found in the United States Pharmacopoeia and National Formulary. Hearings before

Subcommittee of Committee on Commerce on S. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933), 29.
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and deviations from standards or provide that in the establishment of
standards necessary tolerances and deviations be allowed76 Not only does
it seem desirable to so provide, but doing so would remove any likelihood
that standards, failing to provide for tolerances and deviations, could be
attacked as unreasonable because of the impossibility of exact com77
pliance.
IV
The enforcement problems incident to the establishment of a comprehensive mandatory 5 system of standards and grades of quality are in
character no different from those presented by the present Food and
Drugs Act. The proper enforcement of any food and drug legislation
necessitates provisions setting up adequate inspection machinery. This is
especially true where the success of such an elaborate scheme is dependent
upon securing complete adherence. The recognition of this need is attested to by the inclusion in the recent proposals of provisions for factory inspection.7 9 The pending bill goes so far as to provide for what appears to
be compulsory inspection'.80 Adequate inspection should not, however, be
carried to the point where it unreasonably hampers and interferes with the
ordinary business routine. It should be noted, in addition, that the extent
to which inspection may be required would clearly seem to be limited by
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Another question which is tied up with the problem of enforcing standards of quality is what provision, if any, should be made with respect to
the tests, if any be necessary, to be employed in determining whether any
violation in fact has occurred. The statute may provide that particular
tests or those set by some independent body, such as the Association of
76N.C. Ann. Code (1931), § 4764 makes express provision for tolerances and deviations.
See also the Gould amendment to the Food and Drugs Act, 37 Stat. 732 (1913), 21 U.S.C.A.
§§ 9, 10 (1927).
77 See U.S. v. Shreveport Grain and Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
7s It is assumed that the system will be mandatory. It goes without saying that there is no
assurance that a permissive system will produce any beneficial results.
79S. 1944, § 13, 73 d Cong. 1st Sess. (1933); S. 28o, § 13, 73 d Cong., 1st Sess. (i934); S. 5
§ 707, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
Provision for inspection has been provided in other legislation. Butter Act, 32 Stat. 196,
§ 5 (1902), 21 U.S.C.A. § 25 (1927); Cotton Standards Act, 42 Stat. i518, § 7 (1923), 7
U.S.C.A. § 58 (1927); 34 Stat. 126o (1907), 21 U.S.C.A. § 76 (1927), providing for sanitary inspection of slaughtering and packing establishments.
goBy § 707(b) the district courts are authorized to restrain the interstate shipment of food,
drugs and cosmetics if the owner, operator or custodian has denied permission after reasonable
request. It may be therefore that inspection can be compelled only upon a showing of reasonable cause to suspect that a violation has occurred.
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Official Agricultural Chemists, be employed 8' or may provide that the administrative officer adopt such tests as he may deem reasonable. It has
been suggested that statutes which specify the tests to be applied offer an
opportunity to a person required to conform to the standards to determine
for himself whether or not, in fact, he does conform.1 If the statute fails
to do so, a person honestly attempting to conform may find himself in the
predicament, because of the fact that different tests may lead to different
results, of finding it necessary to justify the particular test which he employed. In like manner, the government in any prosecution might also be
compelled to justify the test by which it had determined that a defendant
had been guilty of a violation. 3 Where this is true the same problem
arises as is at present encountered, because of the lack of standards, in the
enforcement of the adulteration and misbranding provisions of the Food
and Drugs Act. But it is not necessary that the statute specify the test to
avoid this difficulty. It would seem that the same end could be accomplished by the statute's specifically requiring the administrative officer to
specify, at the same time he promulgates the standards, the tests which
are to be employed. Such provision will not only make for certainty but
at the same time will permit the administrative officer both to adopt such
tests as appear to him to be reasonable and to keep abreast of scientific
and technical developments. 84 Procedure similar to that governing the
revision of standards may be adopted to prevent too sudden or too frequent change of tests. A system of standards and grades presents no peculiar problems with respect to what is an adequate sample of a product
to be tested.
There remain to be considered but a few considerations arising out of
the problem of enforcement, such as the magnitude, cost and burdens
thereof. It is clear that the attempt to secure conformity to an elaborate
standard and grade system carries with it a tremendous enforcement problem. Nor is it possible to minimize the enormity of the task. But this
81Deems v. City of Baltimore, 8o Md. i64, 3o Atl. 648 (1894); St. Louis v. Grafeman Dairy
Co., I90 MO. 507, 89 S.W. 627 (i9og), Knapp v. Callaway, 52 F.(2d) 476 (D.C. N.Y. 1931).
82St. Louis v. Grafeman Dairy Co., supra note 8i.
83See, for example, Knapp v. Callaway, 52 F.(2d) 476 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1931); U.S. V. 443
Cans of Frozen Egg Product, 193 Fed. 589 (C. C. A. 3d 1912), revd. on other grounds, 226 U.S.
172.

84 In U.S. v. oo Barrels of Vinegar, 188 Fed. 471 (D.C. Mii. riI), it was held that the
fact that the regulations specified certain tests did not limit the government to the use of those
tests.
The substitution of a new test, having sound scientific justification for its use, for a test
long used and still employed by the trade is not unreasonable, Knapp v. Callaway, 52 F.(2d)

476 (D.C.S.D. N.Y.

1931).
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problem reduces itself largely to a matter of providing adequate appropriation and securing competent personnel.8 s As has been shown, the mechanics of inspecting, testing and sampling presents no unusual difficulties. The cost of enforcing the act, which may, in the aggregate, reach a
sizeable amount-a factor often advanced as an insuperable objection to
the adoption of any system of standards-has been rather convincingly
shown to be practically insignificant on a per unit cost basis. n at least
one case in which detailed inspection of the production of canned goods of
the sort contemplated was made under the supervision of the Bureau of
Agricultural Economics of the United States Department of Agriculture,
the cost of inspection was found to be as little as $.ooo2o83 per can or
about one-half cent per case." In no event does the cost compare to the
potential savings, resulting from purchasing on a quality basis, which
may be realized by consumers who would, in all likelihood, be more than
willing to assume the burden of the slight increase in price which might be
necessitated. It cannot be doubted that the setting up of a complicated
and detailed system of standards and grades will tremendously increase
the burden borne at present by persons dealing in foods and drugs of ascertaining whether or not the particular products conform to the requirements of the statute. While the burden may be so greatly increased as to
prevent its being a complete answer, it has never been felt that the obligation imposed upon food and drug dealers of ascertaining this fact at their
own peril is unreasonable.87 It appears, therefore, that no one of these
considerations presents a serious obstacle. In any event, they are not of
sufficient importance to condemn so salutary an improvement as would be
88
realized by a system of standards and grades of quality.
85 See Food Law Spotlight Hits Whisky, Poison, Humbugs and Alcoholic Candy, U.S. Dept.
of Agriculture Press Release, no. izo6-35 (Dec. 4, 1934).
86 What This Quality Grading Business Is All About, Advertising and Selling, 26, 36 (Sept27, 1934). "In the case of the inspection of meat for wholesomeness, the cost is considerably

under one-fiftieth of a cent per pound." Coles, Standardization of Consumers' Goods (1932),
152, citing The Inspection Stamp as a Guide to Wholesome Meat, io-ii, Misc. Circ. no. 63
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (May, 1926).
87 The objection that a statute setting grades and standards would occasion great cost to a
seller to ascertain whether or not products are up to the standard or grade is not a valid legal
objection. City of New Orleans v. Vinci, 153 La.

528,

96 So. 110 (1923).

88While this article has been limited to legislation with respect to foods and drugs, the same
considerations would seem to be applicable, and with equal validity, were the legislation to
encompass other consumers' goods.

